Introduction (II)
• Existing regulatory regime − practically, often based on long-run incremental cost regulation (LRIC)
• Risk premium − European Commission, Draft Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 2008
• Risk sharing − Deutsche Telekom (and others) proposition Practical approaches to NGA regulation (examples)
Question
• What is the relative performance of different regulatory approaches?
• While many suggested approaches to NGA regulation may stimulate investments, do they benefit consumers?
Introduction (III)
• Introducing the main elements of a quantitative equilibrium model, incorporating − uncertainty about NGA market success − (ex ante) investment incentives − (ex post) access / competition conditions − different regulatory regimes in a consistent single framework
• Based on independent research undertaken by ESMT CA (EEA conference paper)
• Presenting numerical solutions to the model − illustrating outcomes of the model − no ultimate recommendation for a specific regulatory regime, further robustness checks necessary
• Suggesting directions for further investigations
Purpose of this presentation
Structure
The model and regulatory regimes 
Results

Extensions and refinements
Summary and conclusions
Main elements to model effects of different regulatory regimes
Investment incentives
Consumer surplus as a function of both investments and access regulation 
Consumer surplus as a function of both investments and access regulation
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Alternative # 2: Regulatory Holiday
Investment decision (e.g. by the incumbent) NGA success:
• Entrant does not get access
• Incumbent does not recover investment costs via (increased) wholesale price NGA failure:
• Incumbent can't increase the wholesale price, no cost recovery
Risk Access Regulation
NGA success NGA failure
Investment incentives
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Alternative # 3: Risk Premium
• Entrant gets access at costs + premium
• Entrant chooses no access
Risk Access Regulation
Investment incentives
The model and regulatory regimes
Alternative # 4: Risk Sharing
Incumbents and entrants agree ex-ante how to share costs and benefits from the investment NGA success:
• First to win a retail customer uses NGA
• No wholesale price arrangements, no investment cost recovery NGA failure:
• No wholesale price arrangements, no investment cost recovery
Risk Access Regulation
Investment incentives
Mathematical implementation
• Two players − investor (incumbent) − access seeker (entrant)
• Both firms have symmetric access to the legacy network
• Two-stage game theoretical framework − NGA investment stage − Cournot retail competition, given the regulatory setting, the legacy network and NGA (non-)success
• Solution via backward induction
• Formal results and numerical results via Mathematica (robust over the plausible parameter range, caveats apply for risk-premium case)
Structure
Results
Extensions and refinements
Summary and conclusions
Investments are stimulated by all regulatory alternatives
• Fully distributed costs (FDC) stimulate investments − lower risk of stranded assets − ex-post cost recovery via wholesale price softens competition and increases returns on investment
• Holiday: in the case of success, access asymmetry as disadvantage for the entrant, incumbent has incentive to invest
• Risk sharing stimulates investments − investment costs and risks are shared − but no ex-post cost recovery via wholesale price intensifies competition and decreases returns on investment somewhat
• Risk premium has relatively low (high) leverage if the probability of success is low (high) [example, requires more robustness checks] • Risk sharing creates the biggest benefit to consumers − increased investment (less as under FDC) − ex-post access to all participating Parties − no ex-post investment cost recovery via wholesale price (intensifies competition)
• Fully distributed costs (FDC) benefit consumers − increased investment − ex-post access to all Parties − but ex-post investment cost recovery via wholesale price (softens competition)
• Risk premium also seems to induce asymmetric market structure (to a lesser extent as holiday); if it has any leverage, it may not benefit consumers [example, requires more robustness checks]
• Holiday induces asymmetric market structure; high NGA investments do not seem to benefit consumers 
Highest consumer surplus Largest NGA investments Regulatory setting
Notes: All results are valid for success probability being sufficiently small, e.g. smaller than 85%
(1) Result and ranking depend on the premium (here + 20%). Further sensitivity checks necessary for validation.
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Extension and refinements (I)
Extensions and refinements
• Current set-up only regards ex-ante regulation
• However, in practice there is an ex-post non margin squeeze obligation
• A non margin squeeze obligation may limit the incumbent's scope to set low retail prices and to penetrate the market
• Hence, a non margin squeeze obligation affects the incumbent's investment decision in the first place
• Does a non margin squeeze obligation benefit consumers in the context of investments under uncertainty?
Incorporate ex-post margin squeeze regulation
Risk premium
• Robustness check with respect to other risk premium cases (optimal risk premium?)
Risk sharing
• Current set-up supposes no ex-post wholesale price arrangements
• Explore effects of alternative risk-sharing arrangements − wholesale prices according to NGA investment costs − wholesale prices freely set by risk-sharing firms
Extension and refinements (II)
• Current set-up only considers asymmetry in terms of investor / non-investor role
• Check results for further asymmetries regarding e.g. market share
Incumbent / entrant asymmetry More than one entrant
• Current set-up only regards one incumbent and one entrant
• Impact of numerous entrants on investment incentives and competition
• Sufficient number of entrants to sign risk-sharing agreements 
